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E-mail address: kongxiangﬁnance@gmail.comBased on a new institutional economy framework, this study examines the formation and
economic consequences of social networks (guanxi) from the perspective of key suppliers
and customers in China. Results show that commercial activities which depend on net-
works are determined by the institutional environment. For example, companies that have
lower accumulated social capital (less trust among people) and are subject to more govern-
ment invention depend more on social network transactions than on the market. In addi-
tion, this study shows that network transactions can provide beneﬁts to ﬁrms, especially in
weak institutional environments. Networks can reduce transaction costs by reducing infor-
mation asymmetry, i.e., increased network dependence is associated with lower credit
costs and lower advertising and sales costs. Networks can also reduce the effect of industry
shocks, especially negative shocks, by creating a bonding mechanism. This study contrib-
utes to our understanding of social networks in emerging markets by providing evidence
on network transactions with key suppliers and customers and their inﬂuence on ﬁrms’
accounting behavior.
 2011 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Previous studies have generally concluded that social networks play an important role in information sharing among con-
nected parties (see a review paper by Allen and Babus (2008)). Nonetheless, there is little academic work examining the role
that social networks play in emerging markets. Khanna and Thomas (2009) ﬁnd that companies in Chile which have social
ties have greater synchronicity due to information correlation. Bunkanwanich et al. (2008) ﬁnd that family ﬁrms use mar-
riages between different groups to form social networks and that the market reacts positively to the announcement of such
marriages. Ball et al. (2003) argue that companies in East Asia conduct business activities using social networks (guanxi),
which means the effect of ﬁnancial accounting on capital markets is limited. However, without a direct measurement of so-
cial networks, we still know little about the role they play in accounting behavior. Using unique data on key suppliers and the
concentration of customers in China, the aim of this study is to provide empirical evidence on how institutions in emergingnal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.
served.
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behavior.
Following a new institutional framework proposed by Williamson (2000), the paper begins with a brief analysis of both
informal (i.e., religion and customs) and formal (i.e., the legal system, degree of property rights protection, market arrangements)
institutions in China and their effect on the governance structure of ﬁrms. We focus mainly on the inﬂuence of social net-
work transactions, proxied by the concentration of key customers and suppliers. The speciﬁc analysis paths are presented in
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by ﬁrmsHypothesis Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 and 3Based on a unique dataset of Chinese listed ﬁrms, we measure the concentration of key suppliers and customers as a mea-
sure of their dependence on social network transactions. Speciﬁcally, if a ﬁrm accomplishes its commercial activities with a
limited number of key suppliers or customers, the ﬁrm will depend more on social network transactions. If the ﬁrm has a
diverse range of suppliers or customers, it will depend less on social networks. Our sample consists of 7401 ﬁrm-level obser-
vations from 2001 to 2008. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms are more likely to establish key customer or supplier connections in regions
where the local economy is less market-oriented or has low social capital, as measured by the level of trust. We also ﬁnd that
the concentration of key customers and suppliers tends to reduce transaction costs, measured by the cost of sales/advertising
and credit, especially in areas with weak institutions. We then ﬁnd that the concentration of key customers and suppliers can
reduce the effect of exogenous industry shocks, although, after distinguishing between positive and negative shocks, we ﬁnd
that the result is only signiﬁcant for negative shocks. These results are robust to controlling for various ﬁrm characteristics.
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we complement previous studies (La Porta et al., 2002;
Zinglas and sapienza, 2004) by showing that institutional differences in the protection of property rights, the local govern-
ment’s propensity to expropriate from local ﬁrms and social capital accumulation have direct effects on ﬁrms’ dependence
on social networks. In addition, this research provides further insights into the ﬁndings of recent studies on the role of social
networks in the ﬁnance and accounting ﬁelds. Anecdotal evidence suggests that as an informal mechanism, social networks
can play a large part in how people conduct business in China, although empirical evidence is rarely provided. The current
research mainly focuses on the role of information sharing among corporate ofﬁcers (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Hwang and Kim,
2009). The ﬁndings in this paper provide further evidence on the potential beneﬁts of social network transactions and the
risk management process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 intro-
duces the methodology and data. Sections 4 and 5 report the empirical results and robustness checks, and Section 6
concludes.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
2.1. Institutional inﬂuences and endogenous determinants of social network transactions
The role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efﬁcient) structure for human
interactions (Acemoglu et al., 2005). We can think of economic institutions as determining the economic rules of the game,
such as the degree of property rights enforcement, the set of contracts that can be written and enforced, and the rules and
regulations that determine the economic opportunities open to people. It is conventional to subdivide institutions into for-
mal institutions, such as the legal system and property rights protection system, and informal institutions, such as customs
and religion. In constructing a new institutional economy framework, Williamson (2000) explains the progressive relation-
ships between institutions including formal and informal institutions, governance structures and economic performance. In
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tions should adopt governance structures that match the external environment. The cross-country results of Acemoglu et al.
(2005) suggest that institutions, including the protection of citizens’ property rights from expropriation by the government,
have a ﬁrst-order effect on long-term economic development. As a transitional economy, China offers an ideal setting for
testing the inﬂuence of different institutions (both formal and informal) on ﬁrm activity. Following Williamson’s, 2000
framework, we analyze ﬁrms’ dependence on social network transactions among different regions of China.
2.1.1. Social capital (informal institutions) and dependence on social networks
Social capital is deﬁned as the advantages and opportunities that are available for people through their membership of
particular communities (Putnam et al., 1993). The source of social capital lies with the people that a person is connected
to, which is an important part of informal institutions, as measured by a trust index. Zinglas and Sapienza (2004) document
that social capital plays an important part in ﬁnancial development. Zhou (2009) use survey data in China and ﬁnd that the
parents of students often pay a New Year call to teachers, which helps to build social ties and helps their children gain
entrance to better high schools. Social capital affects the behavior of individuals because it enhances the level of social pun-
ishment in a society. High levels of social capital generate higher levels of trust towards others, which inﬂuences the way
people do business and their dependence on social network transactions.
Klein et al. (1978) document post-contractual opportunistic behavior in the use of market systems, especially when a spe-
ciﬁc investment is made. To overcome this cost there are two forms of long-term contracts that can be used: (1) an explicit
contractual guarantee that is legally enforced by the government and legal system; and (2) an implicit contractual guarantee
that is enforced by the withdrawal of future business if opportunistic behavior occurs. Due to the weak legal protection in
China, implicit contracts play an even more important part. Trust, as a composition of social capital, is a self-enforcing mech-
anism that reinforces implicit contracts. When one party engages in opportunistic behavior for a current gain, the loss of
trust will result in a loss of value in future transactions. In regions with a weak level of trust among people, implicit contracts
will not be fulﬁlled among the general public; instead, transactions will be limited to familiar groups, such as friends and
families. Such groups (quanzi in Chinese) will construct social networks to fulﬁll implicit contracts. In the sociological liter-
ature on China’s institutions, a great deal of attention is paid to trust. Weber (1920) argues that the low level of trust among
Chinese people is an important reason why capitalism did not initially develop in China. Furthermore, Fei (1948) emphasizes
that trust in Chinese people is based on family or blood connections, and that trust is like a pecking order in which people
only have trust in people who belong to the same group. He documents that a lack of trust induces people to conduct busi-
ness in limited groups to reduce opportunistic behavior, which creates social network transactions. We therefore make the
following prediction, formally stated in the form of a hypothesis:
H1a. Dependence on social network transactions is negatively related to social capital accumulation (trust level).
2.1.2. Rent seeking incentives (formal institutions) and dependence on social networks
China has experienced remarkable economic growth in the process of moving from a centrally-planned to a market-
oriented economy. Although the central government retains its control of political aspects, particularly the appointment
of government personnel, economic decision-making rights have become greatly decentralized to local government, so that
local parties have great inﬂuence over local businesses (Xu, forthcoming). On the one hand, government policies at both cen-
tral and local levels still dominate the allocation of resources through licensing, which tend to promote various rent-seeking
activities. For example, Cull and Xu (2005) ﬁnd that local SOEs can obtain credit from local SOE banks due to natural
government networks, whereas anecdotal evidence suggests that private ﬁrms have to raise capital through social network
ﬁnancing that depends on personal connections. On the other hand, local governments can take the role of a ‘grabbing hand’
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), either by imposing extra fees and ﬁnes on ﬁrms or by setting unfavorably high prices for
resources supplied by local governments.
There are ways for ﬁrms, especially private ﬁrms, to reduce rent-seeking activities and protect their property rights. Chen
et al. (2011) document that private ﬁrms build political connections to reduce local governments’ rent-seeking activities. We
argue that social network transactions can also play a part in stopping the ‘grabbing hand’ of local government. First, local
governments often segment local markets so that ﬁrms cannot undertake outside transactions. Second, rent-seeking activ-
ities jeopardize product development; although an undeveloped market needs limited scientiﬁc knowledge, it will need
more speciﬁc knowledge and network transactions are more suitable for the type of knowledge needed in this setting. Third,
transactions that take place within a limited group will be kept at a distance from government, which can reduce rent-seek-
ing opportunities. We therefore make the following prediction, formally stated in the form of a hypothesis:
H1b. Dependence on social network transactions is positively associated with the rent-seeking incentives of local
government.
2.2. Economic consequences of social network transactions
Recent research provides supportive evidence for the information dissemination effect of social networks in corporate ﬁ-
nance, as reviewed by Allen and Babus (2008). Cohen et al. (2008) ﬁnd that fund managers hold more stock issued by ﬁrms in
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advantage and their stock recommendations earn signiﬁcantly higher returns than those who do not have such social ties.
Similarly, Hochberg et al. (2007) ﬁnd that social networks provide better investment performance in venture capital ﬁrms.
There is also evidence to show that social networks are associated with less monitoring of managers among directors, which
can be regarded as a weak corporate governance mechanism (Nguyen-Dang, 2005). Nevertheless, there is little evidence to
show how social networks affect the commercial activities of ﬁrms, especially in emerging countries. This section will pro-
vide such evidence.
2.2.1. Social network transactions to reduce transaction costs
Williamson (1979) uses uncertainty, frequency with which transactions occur and whether durable transaction-speciﬁc
investments have incurred to characterize the different dimensions of transaction costs. As documented in the previous sec-
tion, social networks are used to arrange non-governmental contracts (or implicit contracts). There are two reasons why
transaction costs will be reduced by this arrangement. First, the creation of a social network will build expectations for re-
peat-purchase transactions, which means the interaction will last longer, occur more frequently and will reduce information
asymmetry. Second, social network transactions require both parties to make speciﬁc investments. As documented by Klein
and Lefﬂer (1981), a premium is offered to other parties to reduce opportunistic behavior ex post; in equilibrium, the pre-
mium will equal a discounted stream of rents on future sales entitled by speciﬁc investments. The premium can be offered
in various ways, especially during transactions with customers and suppliers who share a social network. For instance, cus-
tomers and suppliers will not demand advertisements that signal a product’s quality because they have a private information
channel. They will also demand less prepayment and will not require a high credit payment pattern. In regions with low
social capital (where there is less trust to fulﬁll contracts), the fulﬁllment of transactions will depend more on implicit con-
tracts, and social network transactions will become more important in reducing transaction costs.1 Thus, we make the fol-
lowing prediction, formally stated in the form of a hypothesis:
H2. Firmswithmore social network transactions have lower transaction costs, especially in regions with low social capital.
2.2.2. Social network transactions to overcome external shocks
Contagion is used by Allen and Gale (2000) to explain the emergence of an economic crisis. Furﬁne (2003) and Degryse
and Nguyen (2005) ﬁnd that the failure of one bank can cause contagion and create an industry shock, which refers to an
exogenous factor that affects the industry’s level of proﬁtability. Such shocks can cause the collapse of the whole banking
industry. A report from the Guangdong Academy of Social Science (2009) states that the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 caused over
11,000 companies in Guangdong, particularly export companies, to report large losses in earnings. As argued in the previous
section, social networks offer a premium in the fulﬁllment of implicit contracts; the premiummay take many different forms
and a reduction in the effects of industry shocks is one such form.
There are a number of incentives for the parties in a social network to reduce the effects of industry shocks. First, the par-
ties have an incentive to protect speciﬁc investments, such as research and development costs. If the company makes a big
loss, or even fails, as the result of an industry shock, the speciﬁc investment will not be recouped. Previous studies have
found that a series of mechanisms can be used to protect speciﬁc investments, such as low leverage (Maksimovic and
Titman, 1991; Kale and Shahrur, 2007), greater conservatism (Chen et al., 2008) and greater likelihood of cross-holding stock
(Fee et al., 2006). In this section, we argue that reducing industry shocks also acts as a mechanism for protecting speciﬁc
investments. Second, industry shocks can cause contagion in a ﬁrm’s network counterparts, which will mean that the whole
group fails together. Thus, to protect speciﬁc investments and prevent contagion, there are incentives for ﬁrms to reduce
industry shocks for their partners.
There are many methods for reducing industry shocks in accounting behavior. Take the key customers and suppliers in a
social network transaction as an example. When facing a negative industry shock, such as a widespread increase in produc-
tion costs, the ﬁrm can alleviate the negative consequences by expediting accounts receivable and postponing accounts pay-
able; when facing a positive industry shock, they may negotiate with key customers or suppliers to hide a proportion of their
earnings, as in cookie jar accounting. The ﬁrmmay also do the opposite; because the beneﬁt of doing so is small, the incentive
will be much less than when facing a negative shock. If there is a strong social network, all of these activities should take
place in collaboration with key suppliers and customers2 because they have the incentive to cooperate with each other. Thus,
we make the following prediction, formally stated in the form of a hypothesis:
H3. The effect of industry shocks, particularly negative shocks, is reduced in ﬁrms with more social network transactions.1 Some may argue that a social network transaction is endogenously determined by the external environment. In equilibrium, after we control for
endogenous factors, there should be no relation between transaction costs and social networks. Similar arguments are made by Lehn and Demsetz (1985)
concerning the relationship between ﬁrm performance and ownership structure. However, we believe that this argument does not apply in our setting, because
apart from transaction costs, there will also be production costs, which are inﬂuenced by social networks, both of which should be endogenously determined by
the transaction mode. In our research design, after we control for endogenous arguments in 2SLS regressions, our results remain robust.
2 Anecdotal evidence suggests that Huangguangyu uses key customer and supplier relations for short term ﬁnancing for his retail enterprise building,
especially when the ﬁrm faces severe ﬁnancial constraints, which also supports our argument.
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The regression models used to test the hypotheses are explained below. The measures for social network transactions,
ﬁrm’s transaction costs and industry shocks are introduced after each regression model.
To test hypotheses H1a and H1b, we employ the following models:3 Tru
index is
market
4 ThaNetworktransactionit ¼ a0 þ b1Trustindexþ b2Controllerit
þ b3ROAit þ b4Ageit þ b5Shr1it þ b6Lossit
þ b7Tobin’sQit þ b8Relatedit þ b9Leverageit þ b10Sizeit
þ YearDummiesþ IndustryDummiesþ e ð1Þ
Networktransactionit ¼ a0 þ b1Marketindexþ b2Controllerit
þ b3ROAit þ b4Ageit þ b5Shr1it þ b6Lossit
þ b7Tobin’sQit þ b8Relatedit þ b9Leverageit þ b10Sizeit
þ YearDummiesþ IndustryDummiesþ e ð2Þb1 is the variable to be tested and we expect b1 to be negative. The key variables are deﬁned as follows. Social network
transactions are proxied by the concentration of key suppliers and customers, with greater concentration implying more
dependence on social networks. The CSRC introduced a mandatory disclosure requirement for the concentration of big 5 cus-
tomers and suppliers in 2001. In the regression model, we separate the level of concentration into S-network transactions
(concentration of top 5 suppliers) and C-network transactions (concentration of top 5 customers). The trust index (proxy for so-
cial capital accumulation) is derived from survey data from Zhang and Ke (2002) and the market-oriented index is derived
from Fan et al. (2007), on which higher levels imply better institutions (greater accumulation of social capital or less incen-
tive for government entrenchment).3 The following are included as control variables: Controller is the proxy for the property
rights of the ﬁrm; ROA is the proxy for performance; Age is the number of years a ﬁrm has been listed; Shr1 is the largest share-
holder ownership of the ﬁrm; Loss indicates if the ﬁrm earns a loss; Tobin’s Q measures growth opportunities; Related is a mea-
sure of related party transactions; and Leveragemeasures the ﬁrm’s capital structure. A more detailed description is provided in
Table 1.
To test Hypothesis 2, we employ the following model, similar to Liu et al. (2009):TransactionCostit ¼ a0 þ b1TrustIndexþ b2Networktransactionit þ b3TrustIndex  Networktransactionit
þ b4Controllerit þ b5Shr1it þ b6Tobin’sQit þ b7Sizeit þ b8Leverageit þ b9ROAit þ YearDummies
þ IndustryDummiesþ e ð3Þb2 and b3 are the variables to be tested; according to Hypothesis 2, we expect b2 to be signiﬁcantly negative, and b3 to be
signiﬁcantly positive.
Following Liu et al. (2009), we use the following variables for proxies: Sales expense (cost of sales and discounts as a pro-
portion of total sales), Trust cost-pijk (notes payable as a proportion of credit sales) and Trust cost-yf (prepayments as a pro-
portion of total assets). We also use principal components analysis to generate a new factor, which is the linear function of
the three factors above. Details of the control variables can be found in Table 1. To reduce the endogenous determinants of
social network transactions, we use the 2SLS method4 as a robustness check; the ﬁrst stage is the model used to test hypoth-
esis 1.
To test Hypothesis 3, we employ the following model, similar to Bertrand et al. (2002) and (Jian and Wong, 2010):Perit ¼ a0 þ b1Industryshockt þ b2Industryshockt  Networktransactionit þ b3Sizeit þ b4Leverageit þ YearDummies
þ IndustryDummiesþ e ð4Þb2 is the variable to be tested; according to Hypothesis 3, we expect b2 to be signiﬁcantly negative.
Per is the operating proﬁtability of the ﬁrm. Chen and Yuan (2004) document that listed ﬁrms can use a below the line
method for earnings management; in this setting, social network transactions help the ﬁrm to reduce industry shocks mainly
through normal commercial activities, thus operating proﬁtability is more suitable than net proﬁtability. We adopt industry
codes according to the ‘‘Guide on Industry Classiﬁcation for Listed Firms’’ set by the CSRC. For manufacturing industries, we
include one character and two numerals; for other industries, after deleting ﬁnancial industry, we include only the character.
Thus, we have 21 sub-sectors in the whole sample. Industry shock is the industry median per, excluding the ﬁrm itself. Fur-
ther details on the control variables can be found in Table 1.st index is mainly by a survey for 15,000 entrepreneurs, in order to make the index normalization, we take logarithmic transformation, market oriented
about ﬁve dimensions including market and government relation, development of product market, development of factor and material, development of
intermediaries, and legal environments.
nks to an anonymous referee for this constructive suggestion.
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variables Deﬁnitions
S-network
transaction (%)
The proportion of total purchases accounted for by the ﬁve largest suppliers
C-network
transaction (%)
The proportion of total sales accounted for by the ﬁve largest customers
Sales expense (%) The cost of sales and discounts in the sales revenue
Trust cost-pjzk (%) Notes payable/(notes payable + accounts payable), which reﬂects the proportion of credit transactions
Trust cost-Yf (%) Prepayments/total assets, which reﬂects the the amount paid in advance during a transaction
Inventory (%) Inventory/total assets
Per Operating proﬁt/operating income
Industry shock The industry median per excluding the ﬁrm itself, which is similar to Bertrand (2002).
Market index Used in the market report, from Fan et al. (2007)
Trust index Survey data from Zhang and Ke (2002)
Size The natural logarithm of total assets
Leverage Total liabilities/total assets
Tobin’s Q According to the CSMAR deﬁnition, we use ﬂow per share price  number of shares + net assets per share  number of non-
tradable shares + book value of liabilities)/book value per share
Controller Dummy variable which equals one when the ﬁrm is not a stated-owned enterprise, and equals zero when the ﬁrm is an SOE.
Shr1 The proportion of the largest shareholder
ROA According to the CSMAR deﬁnition, net proﬁt/average total assets
Age Listing years, from the time of listing to August 2010 as the baseline
Loss Dummy variable which equals one when the ﬁrm earns a loss, and otherwise equals zero
Related Related party transactions as a proportion of the total revenue
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4.1. Distribution of the sample
Data on the concentration of key suppliers and customers is hand collected from annual reports from 2001 to 2008 and
ﬁnancial data is sourced from the CSMAR database. After deleting observations relating to the ﬁnancial industry and those
that have missing ﬁnancial data needed for the regression model, there are 7800 observations which disclose information on
their ﬁve biggest suppliers and 9069 observations which disclose information on their ﬁve biggest customers. We only in-
clude the data which discloses the level of both customer and supplier concentration. Our ﬁnal sample has 7401 ﬁrm-year
observations. The sample distribution by year is shown in Fig. 1.
From Fig. 1, we can see that there is a high concentration of key suppliers and customers. The average concentration of big
5 customers is higher than 30% per year and the concentration of big 5 suppliers is higher than 35%. From the time series
trend, we can see that the concentration slowly decreases, which implies that dependence decreases with time. Fig. 2 also
shows the concentration distribution among different regions across China. Taking the concentration of big 5 suppliers as an
example, we can see that there are differences among provinces, with a much lower concentration in Zhejiang, Shandong and
Beijing than in Yunnan, Xizhang and Hainan provinces. The concentration of customers shows a similar trend across regions.
4.2. Descriptive statistics
All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels to reduce extreme values. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. On
average, big 5 suppliers are 39% of purchases and big 5 customers are 31% of sales. We also use principal components anal-
ysis for the basic transaction cost proxy to obtain the linear function5; the coefﬁcients are 0.7177, 0.6977 and 0.4877, which
explains 41.28% of the variable.
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation matrix. The table shows that S-network transactions and C-network transactions are
signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with Market index and Trust index, which supports the prediction of Hypothesis 1. Trust
cost-pjzk is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with C-network transaction, and Trust cost-yf and Sales expense are signiﬁcantly
negatively correlated with S-network transactions and C-network transactions,which supports the prediction of Hypothesis 2.
We ﬁnd no statistical correlation between Trust cost-pjzk and S-network transactions.
4.3. Regression results
This section reports the main regression results. All the OLS regression models are adjusted according to White (1980)
standard errors and include controls for industry and year effects. We also conﬁrm that the VIF for each variable is less than
4, except for year and industry dummies, which suggests that there is no problem with multicollinearity.5 This is for the ﬁrst component. The ﬁgures for the second variable are 0.4850, 0.5142 and 0.7621 which can explain 31.48% of the variables. For a robustness
check, we use the second component and our empirical results remain basically unchanged.
Fig. 1. Concentration of key suppliers and customers of Chinese listed ﬁrms by year.
Fig. 2. (2.1) Concentration of key suppliers of Chinese listed ﬁrms by province. (2.2) Concentration of key customers of Chinese listed ﬁrms by province.
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ket index, 0.602 and 0.360, respectively, are signiﬁcantly negative, with t-statistics of 2.62 and 2.51. Both are statisti-
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
S-network transactions 7401 39.264 23.588 4.100 98.680
C-network transactions 7401 31.818 23.523 1.750 100.000
Leverage 7401 0.515 0.245 0.091 1.837
Trust cost-pjzk 7401 21.320 23.994 0.000 86.409
Trust cost-Yf 7401 3.870 4.284 0.003 22.452
Sales expense 7401 6.016 6.922 0.000 40.426
Market index 7401 7.707 1.901 2.500 10.410
Trust index 7401 3.649 1.181 0.993 5.389
Per 7401 0.001 0.375 2.754 0.477
Industry shock 7401 0.063 0.042 0.012 0.246
Size 7401 19.082 1.423 14.209 22.304
Tobin’s Q 7401 1.385 0.592 0.811 4.365
Controller 7401 0.276 0.447 0.000 1.000
Shr1 7401 0.406 0.166 0.103 0.763
ROA 7401 0.040 0.084 0.394 0.234
Age 7401 12.563 3.111 5.984 18.479
Related 7401 0.061 0.226 0.000 1.875
Loss 7401 0.079 0.269 0.000 1.000
Note. The sample ﬁrms are selected from the CSMAR ﬁnancial statement database. There are 7401 A-share ﬁrm-years observations in non-ﬁnancial
industries with complete ﬁnancial statement data necessary for analysis. A detailed deﬁnition of the variables can be found in Table 1.
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
var1 var2 var3 var4 var5 var6 var7 var8
S-network transactions 1.000
C-network transactions 0.383 1.000
0.000⁄⁄⁄
Market index 0.059 0.067 1.000
0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄
Trust index 0.0666 0.0585 0.902 1.000
0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄
Trust cost-pjzk 0.001 0.080 0.002 0.030 1.000
0.929 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.851 0.000⁄⁄⁄
Trust cost-yf 0.025 0.079 0.073 0.070 0.182 1.000
0.034⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄
Sales 0.124 0.224 0.063 0.059 0.091 0.073 0.019 1.000
0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.006⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.104
Note.  and  indicate that coefﬁcient estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed).
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will concentrate their suppliers and depend more on social network transactions. When C-network transactions is the depen-
dent variable, the coefﬁcient of Trust index is 0.151, but not signiﬁcant (t = 0.66);Market index is 0.290 with a t-statistic
of 2.01, which is statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Overall, Hypothesis 1 is supported by the empirical results.
Table 5 presents the OLS regressions for Hypothesis 2. Trust index is signiﬁcantly negative in each regression, which indi-
cates that social capital can increase transaction costs. When the independent variable is S-network transaction, the coefﬁ-
cient for Sales expense as a dependent variable is signiﬁcantly negative, as predicted, and all other coefﬁcients and
interaction variables are not signiﬁcant, as predicted. When the independent variable is C-network transaction, the coefﬁ-
cients for Trust cost-pjzk, Sales expense and Factor as dependent variables are signiﬁcantly negative as predicted; the inter-
action variables Factor and Trust cost-pjzk are signiﬁcantly positive as predicted; the remaining coefﬁcients and
interaction variables are in the same direction as expected but are not signiﬁcant, as predicted.
Table 6 presents the results for the 2SLS regressions. The results are stronger than for the OLS regressions. When the inde-
pendent variable is S-network transactions, all variables are signiﬁcant as predicted, except for the dependent variable Sales
expense. When the independent variable is C-network transactions, all variables are signiﬁcant as predicted, except for the
dependent variable Trust cost-yf, and the interaction variable with Sales expense is in the opposite direction (the coefﬁcient
is 0.089 and statistically signiﬁcant), as predicted. The empirical results in Tables 5 and 6 partially support our predictions.
Table 7 presents the results for Hypothesis 3. Industry shock is signiﬁcantly positive (with coefﬁcients of 0.350 and 0.402,
both signiﬁcant), suggesting that industry shock can inﬂuence the ﬁnancial performance of ﬁrms. The interaction variable
Industry shock ⁄ S-network transactions and Industry shock ⁄ C-network transactions are both signiﬁcantly negative (0.004
Table 4
Test for Hypothesis 1.
Variables Expectation (1) S-network transactions (2) C-network transactions
Coefﬁcient t-Statistics Coefﬁcient t-Statistics
(a) Test for Hypothesis 1a
Trust_index  0.602 2.62⁄⁄ 0.151 0.66
Controller 3.260 5.19⁄⁄⁄ 2.315 3.78⁄⁄⁄
ROA 3.601 0.95 0.418 0.11
Age 0.254 2.83⁄⁄⁄ 0.104 1.24
Shr1 7.501 4.30⁄⁄⁄ 7.782 4.70⁄⁄⁄
Loss 6.031 4.76⁄⁄⁄ 7.355 5.82⁄⁄⁄
Tobin’s Q 0.004 15.78⁄⁄⁄ 0.005 18.53⁄⁄⁄
Related 2.526 1.86⁄⁄ 4.970 3.31⁄⁄⁄
Leverage 9.186 6.21⁄⁄⁄ 7.951 5.44⁄⁄⁄
Size 2.788 12.09⁄⁄⁄ 2.477 10.80⁄⁄⁄
Constant 83.484 17.61⁄⁄⁄ 73.093 15.77⁄⁄⁄
YEAR Control Control
Industry Control Control
N 7401 7401
ADJUST-R2 0.1689 0.1946
F 89.38 381.35
(b) Test for Hypothesis 1b
Market_index – 0.360 2.51⁄⁄ 0.290 2.01⁄⁄
Controller 3.296 5.24⁄⁄⁄ 2.368 3.86⁄⁄⁄
ROA 3.717 0.98 0.245 0.06
Age 0.259 2.88⁄⁄⁄ 0.131 1.56
Shr1 7.298 4.19⁄⁄⁄ 7.774 4.70⁄⁄⁄
Loss 6.048 4.77⁄⁄⁄ 7.381 5.84⁄⁄⁄
Tobin’s Q 0.004 15.68⁄⁄⁄ 0.005 18.51⁄⁄⁄
Related 2.527 1.86⁄ 4.843 3.22⁄⁄⁄
Leverage 9.148 6.19⁄⁄⁄ 7.912 5.41⁄⁄⁄
Size 2.793 12.12⁄⁄⁄ 2.422 10.53⁄⁄⁄
Constant 84.082 17.75⁄⁄⁄ 73.206 15.84⁄⁄⁄
YEAR Control Control
Industry Control Control
N 7401 7401
ADJUST-R2 0.1688 0.195
F 88.63 389.73
Note. The t-statistics are computed by White (1980) standard errors. ,  and  indicate that coefﬁcient estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively (two-tailed).
X. Kong / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 121–133 129and 0.006), which suggests that when ﬁrms face an industry shock, social network transactions can reduce the shock to
avoid risk.
Next, we separate shocks into positive and negative shocks, using the method described in Xue and Ye (2009). When the
present year’s performance is less than the previous year’s, it is classiﬁed as negative shock, and otherwise as a positive
shock.6 From Table 8(a) we can see that when the industry shock is positive, the interaction variables Industry shock ⁄ S-network
transactions and Industry shock ⁄ C-network transactions are not signiﬁcant (with t-values of 0.03 and 0.35). Table 8(b) shows
that when the industry shock is negative, both interaction variables are signiﬁcant; the coefﬁcients are 0.006 with a t-value of
1.87 and 0.009 with a t-value of 2.78, respectively. We also compute z-statistics to compare the difference between the
coefﬁcients. The difference for Industry shock ⁄ S-network transactions is 2.28, which is marginally insigniﬁcant with a p-value
of 0.1311. The difference for Industry shock ⁄ S-network transactions is 2.28, which is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Overall, the re-
sults support Hypothesis 3, which indicates that social network transactions can reduce industry shocks, especially negative
shocks.5. Robustness checks
Our results remain basically unchanged after conducting the robustness checks described below. We combine S-network
transactions and C-network transactions to create a new variable and our empirical results remain unchanged. Following
Zinglas and sapienza (2004), we use voluntary blood donation level across regions as a proxy for social capital accumulation
instead of Trust index, and we also use ranking levels for Trust index and Market index, and our results remain constant.
Compared with other industries, customer and supplier concentration levels for manufacturing industries may be a better
proxy for social network transactions, so we conduct an analysis on a sub-sample of manufacturing industry ﬁrms and our6 We also separate the shock according to whether the value of the shock is positive or negative and our results remain unchanged.
Table 5
Test for Hypothesis 2.
Variables Expectation Trust cost-pjzk Trust cost-Yf Sales expense FACTOR
Coefﬁcient t-
Statistics
Coefﬁcient t-
Statistics
Coefﬁcient t-
Statistics
Coefﬁcient t-
Statistics
(a) The independent variable is S-network transactions
Trust index  2.224 5.34⁄⁄⁄ 0.358 4.41⁄⁄⁄ 0.326 2.74⁄⁄⁄ 1.687 5.20⁄⁄⁄
S-network transactions  0.004 0.11 0.001 0.14 0.024 2.22⁄⁄ 0.009 0.31
S-network transactions ⁄ Trust
index
+ 0.013 1.33 0.001 0.51 0.001 0.19 0.008 1.10
Controller 4.415 7.01⁄⁄⁄ 0.836 7.04⁄⁄⁄ 1.573 8.67⁄⁄⁄ 0.068 1.34
Shr1 0.052 0.54 0.016 2.00⁄⁄ 0.039 0.77 0.003 12.20⁄⁄⁄
Tobin’s Q 0.002 5.98⁄⁄⁄ 0.001 9.68⁄⁄⁄ 0.003 28.26⁄⁄⁄ 3.521 22.26⁄⁄⁄
Size 4.701 23.11⁄⁄⁄ 0.087 2.01⁄⁄ 0.177 2.86⁄⁄⁄ 9.805 10.19⁄⁄⁄
Leverage 11.575 9.77⁄⁄⁄ 1.583 6.75⁄⁄⁄ 0.808 1.90⁄ 2.984 6.15⁄⁄⁄
ROA 5.132 1.45 3.809 5.88⁄⁄⁄ 12.190 8.62⁄⁄⁄ 4.917 1.73
Constant 76.457 17.07⁄⁄⁄ 1.989 2.13⁄⁄ 15.532 11.61⁄⁄⁄ 61.061 17.60⁄⁄⁄
YEAR Control Control Control Control
Industry Control Control Control Control
N 7401 7401 7401 7401
ADJUST-R2 0.077 0.075 0.280 0.130
F 18.41 17.84 123.53 43.27
(b) The independent variable is C-network transactions
Trust_index  2.570 6.88⁄⁄⁄ 0.409 5.87⁄⁄⁄ 0.415 3.73⁄⁄⁄ 1.927 6.58⁄⁄⁄
C-network transactions  0.119 3.42⁄⁄⁄ 0.010 1.52 0.072 7.96⁄⁄⁄ 0.057 2.11⁄⁄
C-network transactions ⁄ Trust
index
+ 0.026 2.84⁄⁄⁄ 0.000 0.26 0.004 1.50 0.017 2.43⁄⁄
Controller 4.554 7.22⁄⁄⁄ 0.841 7.10⁄⁄⁄ 1.610 8.67⁄⁄⁄ 3.069 6.30⁄⁄⁄
Shr1 0.023 0.26 0.014 1.81⁄ 0.053 1.17 0.052 1.09
Tobin’s Q 0.002 5.45⁄⁄⁄ 0.001 9.05⁄⁄⁄ 0.003 32.25⁄⁄⁄ 0.003 12.36⁄⁄⁄
Size 4.493 22.55⁄⁄⁄ 0.070 1.64⁄ 0.284 4.77⁄⁄⁄ 3.412 21.97⁄⁄⁄
Leverage 11.181 9.58⁄⁄⁄ 1.559 6.67⁄⁄⁄ 0.942 2.25⁄⁄ 9.571 10.03⁄⁄⁄
ROA 5.196 1.48 3.804 5.90⁄⁄⁄ 12.250 8.78⁄⁄⁄ 4.897 1.72⁄
CONSTANT 68.981 16.11⁄⁄⁄ 2.662 2.98⁄⁄⁄ 18.899 14.16⁄⁄⁄ 56.869 17.02⁄⁄⁄
YEAR Control Control Control Control
Industry Control Control Control Control
N 7401 7401 7401 7401
ADJUST-R2 0.150 0.077 0.308 0.128
F 37.05 18.41 123.63 43.56
Note. The t-statistics are computed by White (1980) standard errors. ,  and  indicate that coefﬁcient estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively (two-tailed).
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transaction cost variables, we use the Fama–Macbeth method and panel data method with ﬁxed effects and our main results
remain basically unchanged.6. Conclusions
How do ﬁrms cooperate with one another? Though commercial contracts are important, contracts are incomplete and
their implementation is not well protected in emerging countries (La Porta et al., 2002). Implicit contracts that depend on
social networks may play a more important part than commercial contracts, particularly in emerging countries. Using the
concentration of key suppliers and customers of ﬁrms listed in China as a measure of social networks, this study investigates
the effect of social network transactions on ﬁrms’ commercial activities.
Based on a new institutional economy framework, we provide empirical results on social network transactions and ﬁnd
that social network dependence is endogenously determined by the external institutional background. When regions have a
low level of social capital accumulation and a high incentive for government entrenchment, ﬁrms will depend more on social
network transactions. Empirically, we ﬁnd that key suppliers and customers will concentrate in regions with weak institu-
tions. Dependence on social networks can reduce transaction costs by reducing information asymmetry and uncertainty. We
ﬁnd such evidence in a proxy for credit costs and sales expense, especially in those regions with low social capital, and our
results remain robust after we use the 2SLS method for endogeneity concerns. By reducing contagion effects and protecting
speciﬁc investments, we ﬁnd that dependence on social network transactions can reduce industry shocks; however, our re-
sults are mainly driven by a reduction in negative industry shocks.
This evidence enhances our knowledge of the channels through which social networks can inﬂuence corporate commer-
cial transactions, which is particularly important for businesses in emerging countries. Our study also extends recent
Table 6
Using the 2SLS method to reduce endogenous concerns.
Variables Expectation Trust cost-pjzk Trust cost-Yf Sales expense Factor
Coefﬁcient t-
Statistics
Coefﬁcient t-
Statistics
Coefﬁcient t-
Statistics
Coefﬁcient t-
Statistics
(a) The independent variable is S-network transactions in a 2SLS regression
Trust index  63.673 4.56⁄⁄⁄ 4.083 2.99⁄⁄⁄ 2.372 1.42 0.461 4.53⁄⁄⁄
S-network transactions  6.256 4.40⁄⁄⁄ 0.378 2.72⁄⁄⁄ 0.232 1.37 0.045 4.38⁄⁄⁄
S-network transactions ⁄ Trust
index
+ 1.541 4.44 ⁄⁄⁄ 0.092 2.70⁄⁄⁄ 0.051 1.24 0.011 4.41⁄⁄⁄
Shr1 0.816 1.47 0.037 0.67 0.068 1.03 0.006 1.37
Tobin’s Q 0.009 1.88⁄ 0.001 2.64⁄⁄ 0.003 4.80⁄⁄⁄ 0.000 2.61⁄⁄
Size 2.242 3.02⁄⁄⁄ 0.062 0.85 0.258 2.92⁄⁄⁄ 0.017 3.14⁄⁄⁄
Leverage 5.900 1.95⁄ 1.239 4.19⁄⁄⁄ 0.997 2.76⁄⁄⁄ 0.069 3.15⁄⁄⁄
Controller 3.705 2.65⁄⁄⁄ 0.793 5.80⁄⁄⁄ 1.549 9.27⁄⁄⁄ 0.019 1.90⁄⁄
ROA 1.891 0.23 4.005 4.93⁄⁄⁄ 12.082 12.16⁄⁄⁄ 0.110 1.82⁄
Constant 219.679 3.23⁄⁄⁄ 19.937 3.00⁄⁄⁄ 25.392 3.13⁄⁄⁄ 1.594 3.22⁄⁄⁄
YEAR Control Control Control Control
Industry Control Control Control Control
N 7401 7401 7401 7401
ADJUST-R2 0.111 0.071 0.232 0.130
F 5.99 12.07 76.69 7.63
(b) The independent variable is C-network transactions in a 2SLS regression
Trust_index  35.272 7.26⁄⁄⁄ 1.014 1.88⁄ 2.581 3.13⁄⁄⁄ 0.265 7.22⁄⁄⁄
C-network transactions  4.279 6.95⁄⁄⁄ 0.087 1.27 0.310 2.96⁄⁄⁄ 0.032 6.93⁄⁄⁄
C-network transactions⁄Trust
index
+ 1.039 6.93⁄⁄⁄ 0.019 1.15 0.089 3.50⁄⁄⁄ 0.008 6.89⁄⁄⁄
Shr1 1.157 2.75⁄⁄⁄ 0.008 0.17 0.055 0.77 0.008 2.63⁄⁄⁄
Tobin’s Q 0.007 2.00⁄⁄ 0.001 1.46 0.003 4.31⁄⁄⁄ 0.000 1.07
Size 3.121 7.53⁄⁄⁄ 0.045 0.97 0.158 2.25⁄⁄⁄ 0.023 7.28⁄⁄⁄
Leverage 7.915 3.80⁄⁄⁄ 1.499 6.50⁄⁄⁄ 0.643 1.82⁄ 0.083 5.27⁄⁄⁄
Controller 4.320 4.20⁄⁄⁄ 0.836 7.35⁄⁄⁄ 1.631 9.35⁄⁄⁄ 0.024 3.07⁄⁄⁄
ROA 17.368 2.72⁄⁄⁄ 3.579 5.06⁄⁄⁄ 11.135 10.27⁄⁄⁄ 0.005 0.11
CONSTANT 94.291 3.73⁄⁄⁄ 5.679 2.63⁄⁄⁄ 3.941 0.92 0.739 3.87⁄⁄⁄
YEAR Control Control Control Control
Industry Control Control Control Control
N 7401 7401 7401 7401
ADJUST-R2 0.115 0.060 0.151 0.124
F 11.2 17.2 75.29 13.33
Note. The t-statistics are computed by White (1980) standard errors. ,  and  indicate that coefﬁcient estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively (two-tailed).
Table 7
Test for Hypothesis 3.
Variables Expectation Per Per
Coefﬁcient t-Statistics Coefﬁcient t-Statistics
Industryshock + 0.350 1.68⁄ 0.402 1.81⁄
Industryshock ⁄ S-network transactions  0.004 1.85⁄
Industryshock ⁄ C-network transactions  0.006 2.82⁄⁄⁄
Size 0.081 15.75⁄⁄⁄ 0.081 15.84⁄⁄⁄
Leverage 0.703 18.09⁄⁄⁄ 0.705 18.05⁄⁄⁄
CONSTANT 1.332 11.37⁄⁄⁄ 1.332 11.61⁄⁄⁄
YEAR Control Control
Industry Control Control
N 7401 7401
ADJUST-R2 0.267 0.267
F 21.150 21.940
Note. The t-statistics are computed by White (1980) standard errors.  and  indicate that coefﬁcient estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively (two-tailed).
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vide, our study explores direct evidence on the formation of social networks and the economic consequences from the per-
spective of key suppliers and customers. However, due to the limited disclosure of social networks, especially the disclosure
level of key managers, our results still lack detailed data on the identiﬁcation of social networks, which may be a useful
direction for future research.
Table 8
Separating shocks into positive and negative shocks.
Variables Expectation Per Per
Coefﬁcient t-Statistics Coefﬁcient t-Statistics
(a) Positive industry shocks
Industryshock + 0.677 1.10 0.738 1.31
Industryshock⁄S-network transactions  0.001 0.35
Industryshock⁄C-network transactions  0.000 0.03
Size 0.078 8.47⁄⁄⁄ 0.079 8.36⁄⁄⁄
Leverage 0.538 8.22⁄⁄⁄ 0.538 8.25⁄⁄⁄
CONSTANT
YEAR Control Control
Industry Control Control
N 2203 2203
ADJUST-R2 0.275 0.275
F 12.07 11.55
(b) Negative industry shocks
Industryshock + 0.244 0.64 0.122 0.34
Industryshock ⁄ S-network transactions  0.006 1.87⁄
Industryshock ⁄ C-network transactions  0.009 2.78⁄⁄⁄
Size 0.084 12.57⁄⁄⁄ 0.085 12.69⁄⁄⁄
Leverage 0.707 14.34⁄⁄⁄ 0.706 14.31⁄⁄⁄
CONSTANT
YEAR Control Control
Industry Control Control
N 3942 3942
ADJUST-R2 0.284 0.284
F 13.6 13.73
Note. The t-statistics are computed by White (1980) standard errors.  and  indicate that coefﬁcient estimates are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively (two-tailed).
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